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in Re heaLThSoUTh corp. SecUriTieS LiTiGaTioN
 Company officers and directors rely on the contractual rights contained in 
employment agreements to indemnify them for losses incurred when sued in their 
corporate role.1 These rights, including the right to indemnification and similarly the 
advancement of defense costs, are often essential to raising an effective defense in 
securities litigation.2 As directors and officers cannot often defend themselves effectively 
without incurring exorbitant legal fees, many of these prospective employees will not 
accept employment offers until the rights to advancement and indemnification are 
negotiated.3 Once these individuals execute indemnification agreements, they perform 
their duties under the assumption that such contractual rights will be honored. Under 
Delaware law, even officers who may have breached their fiduciary duties are entitled 
to some rights.4 However, in the context of federal shareholder class action settlements, 
the protection of these rights is no longer guaranteed when the officer is not a party to 
the settlement, even if he is innocent of any wrongdoing.5 Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), partial shareholder class action settlements 
must bar non-settling defendants from pursuing contribution claims against settling 
1. See Baker v. Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 264 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2001). The policy behind indemnification 
statutes is:
[T]o ‘promote the desirable end that corporate officials will resist what they consider’ 
unjustified suits and claims, ‘secure in the knowledge that their reasonable expenses 
will be borne by the corporation they have served if they are vindicated.’ Beyond that, 
its larger purpose is ‘to encourage capable man [sic] [and woman] to serve in the 
knowledge that expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and integrity as 
directors will be borne by the corporation they serve.’
Id. at 151 (quoting Chamison v. Healthtrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 925 n.45 (Del. Ch. 1999)) (citations 
omitted).
2. Id.; see Cathy L. Reese & Brian M. Rostocki, Securing Your Advancement and Indemnification Rights in 
this Uncertain Economic Climate, Fish & Richardson P.C., (May 18, 2009), http://www.fr.com/files/
News/7b67d6d0-7dbc-413e-ba75-7209001e5c5f/Presentation/NewsAttachment/bff29fe3-e6c8-473a-
a607-72af99b3048f/FRsecuring%20your%20advancement.pdf (“[A]dvancement is the . . . obligation to 
pay a director [or] officer legal fees . . . as they are incurred in defending . . . claims against them . . . . 
[I]ndemnification [is] a “post-judgment decision.”); see also Nakahara v. The NS 1991 Am. Trust, 739 
A.2d 770, 778 (Del. Ch. 1998) (“[I]t is well-settled under Delaware law that indemnification and 
advancement are distinct types of legal rights . . . .”).
3. Deborah E. Bouchoux, Business Organizations for Paralegals 313 (5th ed. 2009).
4. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(f) (2010):
A right to indemnification or to advancement of expenses arising under a provision of 
the certificate of incorporation or a bylaw shall not be eliminated or impaired by an 
amendment to such provision after the occurrence of the act or omission that is the 
subject of the civil, criminal, administrative or investigative action, suit or proceeding 
for which indemnification or advancement of expenses is sought, unless the provision in 
effect at the time of such act or omission explicitly authorizes such elimination or 
impairment after such action or omission has occurred.
Id.
5. See In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2009).
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defendants.6 Bar orders afford settling parties finality because they prevent non-settling 
defendants (such as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)) from asserting contribution 
claims against the settling defendants (the company).7 In some situations, courts have 
extended these bar orders to prevent non-settling defendants from enforcing their 
contractual rights to indemnification or advancement of legal fees. However, it is unclear 
if, and under what circumstances, courts may disregard these important rights.8
 In In re HealthSouth Corp. Securities Litigation, the Eleventh Circuit nullified a 
non-settling defendant’s contractual right to advancement of legal fees.9 The issue 
before the court was whether a bar order could extinguish a non-settling defendant’s 
right to indemnification and advancement of legal fees against a settling party under 
the PSLRA. This case comment contends that while the Eleventh Circuit correctly 
held that the PSLRA could preclude a defendant from enforcing his indemnification 
right to reimbursement, the court erred in affirming the bar order extinguishing his 
rights to advancement of defense costs. Specifically, the court improperly extended 
precedent to conclude that the non-settling defendant’s claim to advancement was 
not independent of his liability to the plaintiffs, and therefore could be barred. 
Although this reasoning enabled the court to achieve a result that was in line with 
the public sentiment, it is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the PSLRA: 
the eradication of frivolous securities lawsuits.10
 Richard Scrushy is the former Chairman and CEO of HealthSouth, a Delaware 
corporation.11 In 1994, HealthSouth agreed to indemnify Scrushy if legal action was 
taken against him as a director or officer of the company.12 The agreement also 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A) (2006) (“Upon entry of the settlement by the court, the court shall enter a 
bar order constituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling covered person 
arising out of the action. The order shall bar all future claims for contribution arising out of the 
action[.]”); see generally Richard A. Rosen et al., Settlement Agreements in Commercial 
Disputes: Negotiating, Drafting and Enforcement 14-35 (Supp. 2010) (implying that “partial 
settlements” occur where some, but not all, defendants are parties to the settlement agreement).
7. See Seth Aronson, et al., Recent Developments and Trends in Securities Litigation, in Securities 
Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2009, at 79, 85 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Ser. No. 18078, 2009).
8. This case comment was inspired by Robert Quaintance’s letter to clients and friends. See Client Update 
Letter from Robert F. Quaintance, Jr. & Colby A. Smith, to clients and friends (July 22, 2009) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/73d4b09f-6cff-4693-8b60-
391d0d5e2f63/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/05e0a1bb-5205-4741-a6d6-40451cf58efd/
USCourtRelievesSettlingCorporationofItsObligationtoAdvanceDefenseCostsofNon.pdf.; see also Rosen 
et al., supra note 6, at 14-34 to 14-46 (discussing the split of authority).
9. 572 F.3d at 854.
10. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (containing the legislative history of the 
PSLRA).
11. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857. Scrushy is currently serving a prison sentence for bribing the former 
governor of Alabama in a separate criminal case. WestLaw, 11th Circuit Tosses Ex-HealthSouth CEO’s 
Challenge to Pact, 25 No. 1 Andrews Corp. Off. & Directors Liab. Litig. Rep. 3 (2009).
12. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857; see also 11th Circuit Tosses Ex-HealthSouth CEO’s Challenge to Pact, 
supra note 11. Scrushy must also prove under Delaware law that he acted in good faith and reasonably 
believed he was acting in the best interest of the company. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145 (2010).
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provided that he would be able to recover defense costs if he was successful in his 
defense, and that HealthSouth would advance his attorneys’ fees as they became 
due.13 These agreements are customarily provided to directors and officers of large 
corporations.14
 In 2003, HealthSouth investors filed several class action lawsuits against the 
company and certain officers and directors, including Scrushy, after HealthSouth 
admitted it had inaccurately reported information in its financial statements.15 The 
actions were later consolidated and in 2006, plaintiff investors reached an agreement 
with HealthSouth.16 Scrushy, accused of being the “mastermind of the fraud,” was 
not named a party to the settlement agreement in order to preserve future claims 
against him.17 In addition to HealthSouth and its insurers paying $445 million to the 
plaintiffs, the partial settlement agreement included the mandatory bar order 
prohibiting Scrushy’s claims for contribution against HealthSouth, as required by the 
PSLRA.18 However, the bar order also prohibited Scrushy from enforcing his 
contractual rights to indemnification and advancement of his legal defense costs.19 
Although his civil liability had yet to be adjudicated, the bar order precluded Scrushy 
from enforcing these rights against HealthSouth.20
 In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA to amend the Securities and Exchange 
Acts of 1933 and 1934.21 The PSLRA sought to prevent “abuse in private securities 
lawsuits.”22 Congress cited instances of extorted settlements where innocent parties 
were forced to quickly pay large amounts of money in fear of future defense expenses.23 
13. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857.
14. See Aronson et al., supra note 7, at 104.
15. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 856.
16. See Kyle Whitmire, HealthSouth Will Settle Investor Suits Over Fraud, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2006, at C6.
17. See In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857; Peter Lattman, HealthSouth Settles Class-Action; Plaintiffs and 
Company To Now Team Up On UBS, Ernst & Young, and Scrushy, Wall St. J. L. Blog (Feb. 23, 2006, 4:50 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/02/23/healthsouth-agrees-to-settle-class-action-plaintiffs-and-
company-now-set-sights-on-ubs-ernst-young.
18. See Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Loss of Statutory and Contract Rights Through Settlement Bar 
Orders, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 2009, at col. 1.
19. See id. The relevant part of the bar order reads “The Non-Settling Defendants . . . are hereby permanently 
BARRED . . . from commencing, prosecuting, or asserting any claim for contribution (whether contractual 
or otherwise) against the Released Persons or any other claim against the Released Persons where the injury 
to such entity/individual is any person’s actual or threatened liability to [the plaintiffs] . . . .” (emphasis 
added); In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857 n.5.
20. Scrushy had been acquitted in the criminal case. However, on June 18, 2009, one day after the Eleventh 
Circuit issued its opinion on the bar order, Scrushy was found liable in the civil suit and ordered to pay 
$2.8 billion in damages. See Laurence Viele Davidson & David Beasley, HealthSouth’s Scrushy Liable in 
$2.88 Billion Fraud, Bloomberg, June 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchi
ve&sid=a89tFKR4OevM.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f )(7)(A) (2006).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
23. Id. at 32.
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The PSLRA in part intended to “protect investors and maintain confidence in . . . 
capital markets” through the reduction of coercive settlements.24 A key provision of 
the PSLRA is the mandatory inclusion of a bar order in partial shareholder class 
action suits. The bar order is essential to settlement agreements because it assures 
settling defendants that “they will not face further litigation from either the original 
plaintiffs or their codefendants.”25
 In early 2007, Scrushy challenged the fairness of the partial settlement agreement 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, arguing that the 
bar order should be amended to preserve his contractual rights to indemnification 
and advancement of defense expenses.26 After a hearing, the district court approved 
the partial settlement over Scrushy’s objections and Scrushy filed a motion for 
reconsideration.27 In denying the motion, the district court reasoned that “the 
settlement agreement was fair and that Scrushy was adequately compensated by the 
judgment credit” required by the PSLRA.28 The judgment credit provision strives to 
compensate the non-settling defendant by reducing “the plaintiff ’s verdict by the 
greater of either the amount reflecting the settling defendant’s proportionate liability 
or the amount actually paid to the plaintiff.”29 The court rejected Scrushy’s arguments 
and found, among other things, that the judgment credit would compensate Scrushy 
for any loss of compensation stemming from the extinguishment of his rights to 
indemnification and advancement.30 Scrushy challenged the bar order on appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit.
 Scrushy advanced three arguments to the Eleventh Circuit in support of his 
claim that the bar order went beyond the scope of the PSLRA.31 First, he asserted 
that the PSLRA’s mandatory contribution bar is the only bar allowed under the Act, 
and other bars that preclude the right to indemnification or advancement are 
prohibited.32 Because the PSLRA is silent on whether such claims could be 
extinguished, Scrushy advocated for a narrow reading of the Act. Second, Scrushy 
argued that claims for indemnity and advancement were contractual claims 
independent of his liability to the underlying plaintiff.33 In other words, because his 
claim for advancement of expenses was not based on his liability to the plaintiff 
investors, but on his losses relating to the costs of his defense, this claim was truly 
24. Id. at 31.
25. See Heritage Bond Litig. v. U.S. Trust Corp. N.A., 546 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 2008).
26. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 858. On January 8, 2007 the district court heard arguments. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rosen et al., supra note 6, at 14-38; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(B) (2006).
30. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d. at 862.
31. See Brief of Appellant Richard M. Scrushy, In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 
2007) (No. 07-10701-HH).
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 24.
676
in Re heaLThSoUTh corp. SecUriTieS LiTiGaTioN
separate.34 Third, Scrushy contended he was not adequately compensated under the 
partial settlement for the loss of his contractual rights.35 Regarding the “adequate” 
compensation derived from the judgment credit provision, Scrushy argued that he 
would not benefit from it, as there was currently no adverse judgment to credit.36 
Scrushy also supported his arguments with policy considerations that aimed to 
highlight the importance of protecting employees’ contractual rights.37
 The Eleventh Circuit rejected Scrushy’s arguments and upheld the bar order.38 In 
dismissing Scrushy’s first claim, the court concluded that “there is no provision in 
the [PSLRA] expressly limiting or prohibiting a bar of indemnification claims,” and 
cited supporting case law.39 As to his third claim, the Eleventh Circuit found 
Scrushy’s argument meritless regarding compensation for the loss of his rights. The 
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the judgment credit provided 
Scrushy with adequate compensation40 reasoning that “if Scrushy persists in taking 
the litigation to trial and judgment, the underlying plaintiffs will recover nothing at 
all from Scrushy and other non-settling defendants unless the verdict exceeds $445 
million.”41 Judge Anderson noted that the compensation was significant “in light of 
the perception by the underlying plaintiffs and HealthSouth that Scrushy was a 
central figure in the violations.”42
 As to Scrushy’s second argument, relying on Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG43 and 
Gerber v. MTC Elec. Tech. Co.44 the Eleventh Circuit found that Scrushy’s claim to 
indemnification for amounts he may pay in a future settlement was not a separate, 
independent claim from the underlying litigation.45 In Denney, the Second Circuit 
approved a bar order that extinguished the “claims of a non-settling defendant 
seeking to recover from a settling defendant amounts paid by the non-settling 
defendant in a settlement with the underlying plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact 
34. See id. at 24–25; see also In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 864 (summarizing Appellant’s argument that his 
claim is an independent one because it is based on payments to his attorneys).
35. Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 27.
36. See id. at 14.
37. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 862. (“[P]ublic policy supports indemnification of corporate officers sued 
for actions taken within the scope of their employment. Scrushy points to the governing state law of 
Delaware which allows such broad indemnification. One purpose of the Delaware law is to encourage 
qualified individuals to serve as corporate officers and directors, by safeguarding them when they act in 
good faith on behalf of the corporation.”).
38. Id. at 856.
39. Id. at 860. The court concluded, “the background of case law against which the PSLRA was enacted 
clearly established that the barring of such indemnity claims is permissible.” Id. at 861.
40. Id. at 861.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 866.
43. 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
44. 329 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2003).
45. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 865.
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that the settlement denied the non-settling defendant’s liability.”46 The Second 
Circuit found that the payments sought by the non-settling defendants would be “on 
account of liability or the risk thereof,” meaning they would be nothing more than 
“repackaged contribution claims.”47 Thus, the court in Denney found that the 
payments were not independent claims.48 In HealthSouth, the Eleventh Circuit 
adopted this rationale and concluded that if Scrushy entered into a future settlement, 
it would be on account of his liability to the underlying plaintiff.49 Therefore, any 
claim for indemnification would not be truly independent.50
 Turning to whether the advancement of legal defense fees was an independent 
claim, the Eleventh Circuit could not find clear precedent, acknowledging it had 
“uncovered no circuit court opinion which [had] addressed this issue.”51 While other 
federal courts had explicitly held that the PSLRA may bar claims for contribution, 
no circuit had determined whether a bar order may go as far to invalidate a contractual 
right to the advancement of legal fees.52
 The court then examined Scrushy’s reliance on Gerber.53 In Gerber, then Circuit 
Judge Sotomayor’s opinion modified a bar order to limit a non-settling defendant’s 
claims to those “where the injury is the non-settling defendants’ liability to the 
plaintiffs.”54 Despite the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a non-settling defendant’s 
claims could not be extinguished if he sustained “losses relating to the cost of defense 
arising out of a breached contractual or fiduciary relationship,” the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected Scrushy’s argument with little discussion.55 Instead, the court again adopted 
the “risk thereof ” language in Denney and found that Scrushy’s claim for the denial 
of his contractual rights, his alleged injury, was not an independent claim.56 While 
the Eleventh Circuit conceded that “in the absence of [attorneys’] fee advancement, 
an innocent officer or director might have difficulty proving his innocence, and thus 
might have difficulty realizing a prevailing status,” it observed that such an argument 
46. Id. at 864.
47. Denney, 443 F.3d at 253. The analysis of the bar order relied on Gerber (modifying a bar order by 
limiting a non-settling defendant’s barred claims to those “where the injury is the non-settling 
defendants’ liability to the plaintiffs.”). Gerber, 329 F.3d at 307.
48. See Denney, 443 F.3d at 274.
49. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 864.
50. Id. at 865.
51. Id. at 864.
52. See Heritage Bond Litig. v. U.S. Trust Corp. N.A., 546 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that bar 
orders issued pursuant to the PSLRA “may only bar claims for contribution and indemnity or disguised 
claims for such relief ”); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 186, 189, 193, 200–03, 205 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the scope of bar orders under the PSLRA); See also AAL High Yield Bond 
Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2004).
53. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 863; Gerber v. MTC Elec. Tech. Co., 329 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2003).
54. Gerber, 329 F.3d at 307.
55. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 863–65.
56. Id. at 864.
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must be balanced against the benefits of settlements.57 After concluding that Scrushy 
was not entitled to his contractual right to advancement of legal fees, the court held 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the bar order and 
affirmed its ruling.58
 It is noteworthy that the Eleventh Circuit also considered the extent and scope of 
Scrushy’s alleged wrongdoing in considering his arguments. The court observed that 
“Scrushy proffered or adduced no evidence in the district court indicating that he 
was merely an innocent bystander with respect to the violations,”59 thus suggesting 
that it may have reached a different result had Scrushy been innocent.60 While 
Scrushy had been acquitted of criminal wrongdoing in 2005, on June 18, 2009, one 
day after the Eleventh Circuit upheld the bar order, an Alabama county court found 
Scrushy personally liable for $2.88 billion.61 Although the bar order language in the 
PSLRA is silent regarding the non-settling defendant’s conduct, the Eleventh Circuit 
seems to have relied on Scrushy’s involvement in the wrongdoing as a basis for its 
decision.62
 Although the Eleventh Circuit correctly ruled on the issue of Scrushy’s 
indemnification rights to reimbursement, the court erred in failing to properly 
analyze precedent addressing whether the advancement of legal fees was an 
“independent” claim.63 An examination of Gerber and courts that have applied its 
reasoning suggests that injuries resulting from the loss of defense costs are independent 
claims when considering the underlying purpose of the PSLRA.64 Other courts have 
found Gerber to support the limitation of bar orders extinguishing contractual rights 
in partial settlement agreements. 65
 However, the Eleventh Circuit, claiming to find no clear authority supporting its 
holding that Scrushy’s advancement rights were not independent claims, improperly 
extended Gerber to hold that a CEO, like Scrushy, may be stripped of his rights.66 In 
57. Id. at 865. But see Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 18 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of the PSLRA neglects the legislative intent to prevent extorted settlements). See also H.R. Rep. No. 
104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
58. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 867–68. The Eleventh Circuit held, “[a]pplying the general fair, adequate 
and reasonable standard to Scrushy’s argument, we readily conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion.” Id. at 867.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 865.
61. Valerie Bauerlein & Mike Esterl, Judge Orders Scrushy to Pay $2.88 Billion in Civil Suit, Wall St. J., 
June 19, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124533875598827811.html.
62. See Quaintance & Smith, supra note 8.
63. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 866.
64. See Daiwa Secs. Am. Inc. v. Grande Holdings Ltd., No. 98-CV-336(JG)(JO), 2007 WL 4180664, at 
*3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007); see also Heritage Bond Litig. v. U.S. Trust Corp. N.A., 546 F.3d 667, 
677–78 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. Heritage, 546 F.3d at 667; Daiwa, 2007 WL 4180664.
66. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 869.
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Gerber, a non-settling defendant argued that he had sustained damages arising out of 
a contractual relationship with a settling defendant.67 The Second Circuit found that 
if the non-settling defendant “were to prove . . . losses relating to the cost of defense 
arising out of a breached contractual or fiduciary relationship with . . . a settling 
defendant . . . any such claims should not be extinguished.”68 Here, Scrushy’s damages 
also arose from the losses relating to the costs of his defense69 and these damages, 
suffered by Scrushy, were separate from any damages suffered by the plaintiffs.70 If 
the Gerber court found that such a loss arose independently of liability to the 
underlying plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit should have found that Scrushy’s claim for 
the advancement of legal fees was independent.
 As a result of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, federal courts caught between 
balancing the advancement rights mandated by Delaware law and the silence of the 
PSLRA, are left with no clear guidance. Courts will look to factors not contemplated 
by the statute, such as the non-settling defendant’s wrongdoings in approving or 
modifying bar orders.71
 The Eleventh Circuit hastily dismissed relevant authority in rejecting Scrushy’s 
claims for advancement. The district court in Daiwa Sec. Am., Inc. v. Grande Holdings 
Ltd. lends support to Scrushy’s position. There, the court read Gerber to hold that all 
claims beyond indemnification and contribution, which would include the 
advancement of legal defense costs, could not be extinguished by a bar order.72 In a 
footnote to its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that Daiwa provides “some 
support for Scrushy’s argument that barring his claim against HealthSouth for 
advancement of attorneys’ fees would exceed the appropriate scope of a bar order.”73 
However, without addressing the merits of Daiwa, the court merely rejected the 
holding as unsupported.74
67. Id. at 864.
68. Gerber v. MTC Elec. Tech. Co., 329 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2003).
69. See In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 865. One such loss relating to the cost of Scrushy’s defense was the 
failure of HealthSouth to advance legal fees.
70. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 18.
71. Kevin LaCroix, attorney and author of The D&O Diary (a periodic Internet blog containing items of 
interest from the world of directors and officers liability), observed: “My overwhelming impression of 
this opinion is that the outcome was dictated by the identity of the appellant.” Kevin LaCroix, Eleventh 
Circuit: HealthSouth Settlement Appropriately Eliminated Scrushy’s Indemnification Rights, The D&O 
Diary (June 18, 2009), http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/06/articles/securities-litigation/eleventh-
circuit-healthsouth-settlement-appropriately-eliminated-scrushys-indemnification-rights/. In rendering 
a $2.8 billion judgment against Scrushy in the civil suit, Judge Horn referred to Scrushy as the “CEO of 
the fraud.” Davidson & Beasley, supra note 20.
72. Daiwa Secs. Am. Inc. v. Grande Holdings Ltd., No. 98-CV-226(JG)(JO), 2007 WL 4180664 at *3–4 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007). This holding assumes that the non-settling defendant has not been 
compensated by the judgment credit.
73. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 864 n.10.
74. Id. (stating that “the Daiwa district court offered no satisfactory rationale to support that position.”). 
But see Daiwa, 2007 WL 4180664, finding that the language of Gerber suggests an “explicit intention to 
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 Although the court may have found that Scrushy’s claims for advancement were 
independent, it rejected them because they were not “truly” independent.75 What 
distinguishes independence from “true” independence?76 The Ninth Circuit examined 
a non-settling defendant’s claim relating to the underlying litigation and came to a 
result at odds with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding.77 In Heritage Bond Litigation v. U.S. 
Trust Corp. N.A., the Ninth Circuit adopted Gerber and reversed the district court’s 
finding that a bar order precluded a non-settling defendant’s independent claims.78 
One claim, a state law claim of breach of fiduciary duty, was found to be independent 
of the underlying securities class action.79 Here, Scrushy’s claim to advancement of 
legal fees was also a separate obligation governed by state law that predated the 
securities litigation.80 If Scrushy had entered into the agreement after the litigation 
commenced, there would be little question that it was sufficiently related to his liability 
to the underlying plaintiffs. Consequently, under the Eleventh’s Circuit’s rationale, 
Heritage would not likely survive its adoption of Gerber. The Heritage opinion suggests 
that, under Gerber, a contractual claim for advancement, which is a claim independent 
of reimbursement or contribution, cannot be extinguished by a bar order. Applying 
Heritage’s analysis of Gerber to the facts of HealthSouth, the Eleventh Circuit would 
have had to find Scrushy’s claim was independent. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit chose to 
rely on Denney, a case less on point but more in line with the court’s prerogative of 
barring Scrushy’s rights.81 Therefore, under Gerber, Scrushy’s contractual right to 
advancement of legal fees would have been preserved.
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the bar order is inconsistent with the 
PSLRA.82 An underlying purpose of the PSLRA was to prevent abuse in securities 
litigation by reducing coercive and extorted settlements.83 However, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision to extinguish Scrushy’s contractual rights undermines the legislative 
intent by encouraging extortive settlements. After HealthSouth, a concern exists that 
“plaintiffs will be able to use the threat of extinguished advancement rights to increase 
‘ensure that the only claims that are extinguished are claims where the injury is the non-settling 
defendants’ liability to the plaintiffs.” Id. at *4 (quoting Gerber, 329 F.3d at 307).
75. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 865.
76. Gerber holds courts must limit the barred claims to those “where damages are calculated based on the 
non-settling defendants’ liability to the plaintiffs” and Denney holds claims must be barred “on account 
of liability or the risk thereof ” to the underlying plaintiffs. Gerber, 329 F.3d at 305 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis added); Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 274 (2d Cir. 2006).
77. Heritage Bond Litig. v. U.S. Trust Corp. N.A., 546 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2008).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 679–80.
80. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 857.
81. See id. at 861. Unlike Denney, Gerber specifically addressed the issue of attorney fees: “Here . . . plaintiffs 
are headed to trial against the non-settling defendants on the RICO and state law claims under which 
they seek attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.” Gerber, 329 F.3d at 303 n.2.
82. See Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 18.
83. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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their leverage in settlement negotiations with individual director and officer 
defendants . . .” and “officers will feel greater pressure to settle and pay damages out 
of their own pockets. ”84 Additionally, “the threat of losing such rights will prevent 
companies from attracting qualified people to serve on company boards.”85
 The PSLRA sought to bring integrity to the securities litigation context, as 
Congress reasoned that capital markets depend on intelligent and ethical individuals.86 
If not advanced legal fees, as the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges, an officer will find 
proving his innocence difficult.87 These important policy considerations are firmly 
supported by the reasoning in Gerber, but not the Eleventh Circuit’s holding.88 After 
weighing the implications of extinguishing one’s contractual right to advancement of 
legal fees, it is clear the HealthSouth bar order exceeded the scope of the PSLRA.
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to bar Scrushy’s rights to advancement could be 
viewed as a victory to the countless victims of Scrushy’s fraud. Morally speaking, 
Scrushy certainly did not deserve the advancement of legal fees from the company he 
tarnished.89 Had Scrushy’s innocence been undisputed, the court would likely not 
have upheld the bar order.90 While the Eleventh Circuit was free to weigh many 
factors, the court’s decision to take into account the non-settling defendant’s conduct 
is not supported by case law or the PSLRA.91 By improperly extending Gerber, the 
Eleventh Circuit was able to find a way to bar Scrushy’s advancement rights. In re 
HealthSouth Corp. Securities Litigation sets a dangerous precedent where one can 
arbitrarily be stripped of rights considered essential in the world of corporate 
governance.
84. Quaintance & Smith, supra note 8, at 2. The Eleventh Circuit states “that the public policy of Delaware 
. . . must be balanced against countervailing policies in favor of settlements and against indemnification 
in the securities litigation context.” In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 862. However, the “favor” towards 
settlements encourages coercion: exactly what the PSLRA sought to prevent. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-
369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
85. See Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002). The policy of indemnification 
legislation is “to encourage capable men to serve as corporate directors, secure in the knowledge that 
expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and integrity as directors will be borne by the 
corporation they serve.” Donohue v. Corning, 949 A.2d. 574, 577 (Del. Ch. 2008).
86. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
87. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 865.
88. See Gerber, 329 F.3d at 297.
89. In re HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 867–68.
90. See Davidson & Beasley, supra note 20.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A) (2006).
